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Justice Reinvestment: “Motherhood and Apple Pie?”—Matching 
Ambition to Capacity and Capability  
Kevin Wong, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK
*
 
Kris Christmann, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK 
This paper compares the implementation of Justice Reinvestment (JR) across the United 
Kingdom and the United States to answer a fundamental overarching question: what capacity 
and capability are required to effectively implement JR? For this paper, capacity refers to 
resources including staff, premises and technology and capability refers to skills, experience 
and expertise. 
Being able to implement JR effectively is critical to demonstrating that it can work in the U.K. 
as well as in any other jurisdiction.  In particular, this requires matching the ambition and 
scale of any proposed JR initiative to the capacity and capability of the commissioners - those 
who design and pay for a JR program) and providers - those tasked with delivering it. It is 
doubly curious then that this test is seldom applied, whether for JR initiatives, or indeed any 
criminal justice intervention. 
This paper will propose a standard framework to guide the commissioning and 
implementation of future JR initiatives. In doing so it aims to enable effectiveness 
comparisons to be made within and across different jurisdictions, one which is capable of 
building a more comprehensive international evidence base for JR programs.   
In the U.K. the implementation of JR has been limited to a fragmented set of largely 
uncoordinated schemes, originating in different government departments—the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ), Department of Health, and Department of Communities and Local 
Government. They have operated at different levels of administration—national, regional and 
local, working to targets ranging from specified fiscal savings, to reduction in reoffending, to 
a basket of measures spanning the disparate spheres of employment, crime, child welfare, and 
mental and physical health. 
This “mixed economy” of development contrasts sharply with the United States, where since 
2010, supported by the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), twenty-four states and 
seventeen localities (i.e., counties) have engaged in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI).
1
  
This has enabled a more consistent approach to JR development than seen in the U.K. At the 
same time, JR expansion in the U.S. has been channelled along a criminal justice system 
(CJS) redesign approach and away from the social justice model favored by Tucker and 
Cadora.
2
  CJS redesign has also largely been adopted in the U.K. despite early backing for 
Tucker and Cadora's social justice emphasis from U.K. proponents of JR.
3
 
Underpinning the development of JR in the U.K. and the U.S. is an explicit economic 
argument centered on providing a better return for society than the current criminal justice 
system provides: that there are more cost-effective approaches to reducing crime than are 
currently being deployed; that the social resources saved through change would more than 
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outweigh the costs; that savings should be reinvested in further justice-promoting 
innovations; and that this would lead to a virtuous spiral where criminality declines and costs 
are reduced.
4
  JR stands out from other approaches to criminal justice reform by the extent to 
which it is data-driven.
5
 This is illustrated by the four-step approach to JR advocated by the 
U.K. Justice Committee and the U.S. Council of States Government. “Justice mapping” here 
requires (1) analysing prison population and public spending on the CJS; (2) examining the 
provision of options for generating savings and increases in public safety; (3) quantifying 
savings and reinvestment; and finally (4) measuring impacts and evaluating program 
effectiveness. 
One of the central innovations characterizing JR approaches concerns a focus on particular 
places where offenders come from rather than just processing individual offenders. Such an 
environmental penological turn requires looking at alternative measures outside the 
traditional CJS structure. That JR should be about place-based approaches has its foundation 
in the seminal paper from Tucker and Cadora, which introduced the concept of the "million 
dollar block,” based on the annual cost of incarcerating individuals from the block.6  This has 
influenced much U.K. thinking about JR, including Allen's early view that JR should 
"improve the prospects of not just of individual cases but of particular places.”7  
This focus on place has been further supported in the U.K. by calls for localism as a means of 
delivering JR
8
 and boosted by the devolution of government budgets to Greater Manchester.
9
 
In the U.S., responsibility for criminal justice and prisons is already devolved to individual 
states and counties due to the relatively greater independence of states from the federal 
government and appears to have enabled development of JR in the U.S. to advance more 
rapidly than in the U.K.
10
  As such this need for devolved structures represents an important 
learning point for commissioners.  
This paper is structured in the following way. Part I will examine JR across the dimensions 
of: determining scale; realizable savings; reinvestment; resourcing; project implementation; 
effective working between agencies; using evidence; defining outcomes; and measurement. 
Part II will propose a universal framework for the planning and implementation of JR 
programs based on a modelling, evaluation and capability component.  Part III will conclude 
by considering the future development of JR in the U.K. 
I. Dimensions of JR 
A.  Determining Scale  
Consideration of scale has been part of the discourse around JR in the U.K.  This has 
previously focused on the size of an area large enough to generate sufficient offenders 
diverted from custody to reduce the use of custody, such that a prison wing could be closed.
11
 
The experience of JR implementation in the U.K. suggests there is a trade-off between scale 
(used in this paper as a proxy for ambition) and capacity and capability to commission and 
effectively implement any proposed initiative. Based on the U.K. experience, four factors 
have thus far determined scale: 
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 The extent of criminal justice redesign attempted as measured by the number of points 
in the CJS across which the initiative operated: pre-arrest, arrest, sentencing, 
community sentence, custody, and release from custody;   
 The extent to which the initiative operated outside the CJS by adopting a social justice 
approach to JR, which can be measured by the number of social capital outcomes 
attempted
12
; 
 The offender population targeted: young offenders (aged under 18), whether female 
or male only, level of offending (i.e., whether all or just prolific offenders), disposal 
type (e.g., short-sentenced prisoners—less than 12 months), or risk of a short 
custodial sentence; and 
 The geographical unit of delivery: neighborhood, local authority, groupings of local 
authorities, or police force area, as well as geographical extent (i.e., whether operated 
as a pilot in a few locations or whether adopted countrywide).  
In the U.S., scale has largely been determined by only two factors: the size of the 
administrative unit adopting JR (either the state or locality) and analysis identifying the main 
population and cost drivers, informing the types of interventions to implement for which 
offender populations.
13
 The U.S. approach is more straightforward and more in keeping with 
the four-step approach to JR noted earlier.  In the U.K., the approach to determining scale has 
been shaped by which government agency has provided the resources for the scheme, the size 
of the budget, and what the designers are aiming to test. In some instances, JR has been 
incidental, offering only an implicit rather than an explicit aim. 
 B.  Realizing Savings  
Ultimately, given the economic rationale underpinning JR, consideration about whether an 
initiative is worth doing has to be decided by the amount of cashable savings within a 
specified time period that can be achieved for the effort required.  
In the U.K., Southwark, a London local authority involved in the Local Justice Reinvestment 
Pilot, achieved a reward payment (based on savings from averted costs
14
) of the equivalent of 
$755,580 at the end of the first year and $1,240,680 at the end of the second year, a total over 
the pilot of $1.99 million.
15
 While there was criticism by the pilot sites about the complexity 
of the metrics, due to their number, the sites benefited financially from this “complexity.”16 
Measuring demand reduction across metrics which reflected savings in court administration; 
use of Community Orders, Suspended Sentence Orders, and custodial sentences (of less than 
12 months); and twelve probation requirements for adults, generated greater savings than 
would have been possible based on a single measure such as reducing the use of custody. 
The experience of the JRI in the U.S. has shown that at a local-area level it may be possible 
to generate projected annual savings ranging from  $112,970 in Grant County, Indiana, from 
focusing probation resources on medium and high risk offenders; to $600,000 in Delaware 
County, Ohio, from establishing a specialized court program for repeat Operating a Vehicle 
Impaired offenders, and offering early intervention to expedite the resolution of lower-level 
felony cases.
17
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The projected savings generated by the JRI at a state level have taken two forms: “averted 
operating costs” from incarcerating a smaller population and “averted construction costs” 
from not having to build new facilities to incarcerate larger populations.
18
  The savings, based 
on Technical Assistance Provider projections, vary considerably, but nevertheless 
demonstrate very substantial savings. Arkansas, a state with one of the highest projected 
levels of savings at $875 million over 11 years (an average of $79.6 million per annum) 
projected $646 million of averted operating costs and $229 million of averted construction 
costs. This compared to Delaware, a state with the lowest projected level of savings at $27.3 
million over 5 years (an average of $5.5 million per annum) comprised solely of averted 
operating costs. 
In the U.K., in addition to savings from demand reduction, schemes have also tested savings 
derived from reductions in reoffending, but these results have been disappointing.  They have 
either not been achieved—such as in the Diamond Initiative19 and Liaison and Diversion pilot 
for young offenders
20—or, where a sufficient reduction in reoffending was attained, the 
reward “payment” showed no linkages to savings accrued.21 While not ruling out the use of 
reoffending as a metric, the U.K. and U.S. experience suggests that calculating savings based 
on demand reduction provides a more direct way of both identifying and generating savings. 
The Troubled Families Programme operating across 143 local authorities in England (and 
arguably the most comprehensive social justice U.K. JR initiative) was estimated to have 
accrued £1.2 billion of taxpayer savings.
22
 However, this result has been called into question 
and described rather damningly by the Head of the U.K.'s National Institute for Economic 
and Social Research as "pure adulterated fiction."
23
 The alleged sleight of hand in calculating 
the estimate is failing to take into account what would otherwise have been spent on those 
families, which when factored in substantially reduces the savings being claimed.  Nor was 
there data on what would have happened without the program (i.e., there was no 
counterfactual). Buried within the methodology report on the Government website and not 
referenced or reflected in the press release is an acknowledgement that the savings figures 
provided were gross and did not account for deadweight—improvements in outcomes which 
would happened anyway in the absence of any intervention.  Needless to say, these caveats 
seriously undermine the size of any “headline savings” being claimed. As of the time of this 
writing, the independent evaluation of the program commissioned by the same government 
department has yet to produce any estimates of impact. 
This caution is also reflected in the assessment of JRI implementation, where the savings 
reported were based on projections:  
[I]t is too early in the implementation process to offer definitive conclusions 
on what actual population and cost reductions will look like or how they will 
compare with projected cost and population impacts. State populations and 
cost savings can be affected by political, economic, and social changes, factors 
that could not be accounted for when the projections were made. Challenges in 
implementation can also alter the impact of JRI on costs and populations, 
distancing actual numbers from the original projections.
24
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While this indeed illustrates the case against the way that statistics are used and calls to mind 
the old adage of “lies, damned lies and statistics,” it also strongly indicates the need for an 
overarching standard framework to define JR and assess its effectiveness. 
C.  Reinvestment  
In the U.S., the reinvestment of savings under JRI has been characterized by two modes of 
investment:  
 pre-investment—providing funding for programs based on anticipated savings; and  
 post-investment—reinvestment of actual savings and averted spending25 
Of the seventeen states assessed by La Vigne and her colleagues, ten had made pre-
investment of savings, two post-investment, one both pre- and post-investment, and four no 
investment.
26
  At the local-area level, although implementation was less advanced, a number 
of localities had identified opportunities for generating savings and had earmarked projects 
for reinvestment.
27
  
In the U.K., pre-investment was important to incentivize Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) to 
instigate changes to reduce custody bed nights in the Youth Justice Reinvestment Pathfinder, 
although they were also motivated by avoiding a financial penalty if they failed to meet  
reduction targets set by the YOTs themselves.
28
 In contrast, the Local Justice Reinvestment 
Pilot provided only post-investment reward payments if demand reduction targets were 
achieved.  As a consequence, the pilot sites invested limited resources, especially as failure to 
achieve the target was penalty free.
29
 This suggests that the type of incentives which are 
devised are therefore critical to influencing decision making and achieving the desired 
behavior, reflecting the important role that commissioners play in being “choice architects.”30 
Not all U.K. schemes involved targets and penalties, however. The Whole System Approach 
to Women Offenders scheme in Greater Manchester received pre-investment based on 
projected reductions in demand on CJS and non-CJS services.
31
  The Whole System 
Approach to Young Offenders adopted across Scotland was one of local agencies adopting a 
more streamlined and joined-up approach to reduce the unnecessary use of custody and 
secure accommodation.
32
  
D.  Resourcing  
In the U.S., which gave birth to the concept of JR, and very much in contrast to the U.K., 
there has been a steady development in the implementation of JR. As noted by Allen, this has 
been due in part to the localization of justice—the U.S. reforms have been possible due to a 
highly devolved justice system to state and county level—and a changing political context, 
where political conservatives have embraced prison reform.
33
  However, it has also been 
made possible by the technical support funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, which 
covered a wide range of supporting services such as analysis of justice data; coordination of 
bipartisan forums and working groups; development of tailored programs, policies, and 
interventions; identification of evidence-based reinvestment strategies; and assistance in 
monitoring delivery and assessing impact and cost benefits.
34
 In short, technical support 
 6 
 
covered the four-stage process proposed by the U.K. Justice Committee and Council of States 
Government. 
JR in the U.S. has not only benefited from this technical assistance to help states with 
implementation planning, but also from further “subawards” that were made to support JR 
implementation.
35
 These averaged $325,000 per state. Of the total sum of $2,930,882 
allocated to the subawards, 59% paid for training for criminal justice staff and educating 
stakeholders about state-specific JR statutes.  Data management, evaluation, and cost-savings 
measurement accounted for 19%; program development and infrastructure expenditure 
represented 15%; and administrative assistance to oversee JR activities accounted for the 
remaining 6% of subaward expenditure. 
Comparable dedicated funding to support the systematic development of JR in the U.K. has 
been absent. Rather resourcing has been piecemeal and confined to a small number of pilot 
initiatives. Only the Troubled Families Programme, operating in each of the 143 English 
local authorities and championed by the Prime Minister, David Cameron, attracted substantial 
resourcing, equivalent to $658 million over three years.
36
 This has led to a considerable 
deficit in the development of JR in the U.K. compared to the U.S.   
E.  Project Implementation 
In their meta-analysis of strategies and interventions to prevent and reduce youth crime and 
anti-social behaviour, Andy Ross and colleagues found that the quality of program 
implementation was critical: "This was so important that a less effective but well 
implemented programme could out-perform a more effective programme that was poorly 
implemented."
37
 The elements of effective program implementation, which they referred to as 
falling into "the category of motherhood and apple pie," were effective leadership and 
communication, ensuring that all staff understood their roles, and allowing sufficient time for 
planning and set-up prior to the launch.
38
 
Ensuring that new initiatives are designed and delivered in the right way is central to Dawson 
and Stanko's reflections captured in their aptly titled paper "Implementation, Implementation, 
Implementation: Insights from Offender Management Evaluations."
39
 This was based on their 
experience of evaluating offender management interventions including the Diamond 
Initiative, promoted as a JR scheme by the commissioners. Their central argument is that the 
quality of project implementation hindered the process of testing whether an intervention 
worked or not—did the intervention fail to show a positive result because it did not work or 
because it was so poorly implemented that it could not work?    
The evidence from the evaluations of other U.K. JR schemes suggest that a higher level of 
competency is required for the implementation of JR than for other CJS initiatives, given the 
need for data and economic analysis. While government commissioners of initiatives may 
have had such specialist capabilities, or have the resources to purchase such services, it was 
largely absent from the majority of providers.  Given the mission critical nature of project 
implementation, the relative absence of such specialist supporting services for U.K. programs 
bodes ill for the development of JR.  
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The final evaluation report of the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot highlighted the need for 
investment in the capacity and capability of both commissioners and providers in relation to 
both these aspects.
40
  The evaluation reports of the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment 
Pathfinder found considerable variation in the capacity and capability of YOTs to effectively 
analyze and interpret data, and use it to inform delivery.
41
 Stepping back from the analysis of 
data, the capacity and capability of provider agencies to record relevant management 
information in a systematic way was found wanting and hampered the evaluations of the 
Whole System Approach to Women Offenders,
42
 the Liaison and Diversion for young 
offenders project,
43
 and the Whole System Approach to Young Offenders in Scotland.
44
 Since 
2010, the U.K. government has generally adopted a laissez-faire, hands-off approach to 
program implementation, on the basis that local agencies have the competency to make it 
happen. The plain truth is that much-needed technical support has largely been absent. At the 
same time, the evidence base and learning around JR suggests that without technical support 
effective implementation is unlikely to occur. It would appear then that such investment is a 
necessary prerequisite for any fully functioning JR scheme. 
F.  Effective Working Between Agencies 
Working between agencies (commonly referred to as partnership working) to reduce crime 
has been a key objective in the U.K. since the landmark Morgan Report.
45
 The 
implementation of JR in the U.K. has been predicated on agencies working more effectively 
together. It may appear obvious to suggest that the more stages of the CJS over which a 
scheme operates, the more agencies need to be involved and therefore the greater level of 
complexity that is introduced. Similarly, where schemes such as the Troubled Families 
Programme operate with services both inside and outside of the CJS, this adds further 
organizational complexity.  Similarly, differences in co-terminosity, for example, between 
court administration, policing units, and local authorities, and between where a prison is 
located and the discharge destinations for inmates, compound complexities. The experience 
in the U.K. suggests that this complexity is not always adequately acknowledged, in 
particular by calibrating effort commensurate to effectively engaging with the number of 
agencies which need to be involved and obtaining their buy-in to build successful partnership 
working.
46
   
Examples of these challenges in the U.K. include the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot, which 
operated at a number of stages of the CJS and had limited involvement of sentencers in a 
number of sites and in one site had difficulty obtaining buy-in from the police.
47
 The Liaison 
and Diversion scheme for young offenders operating at a single point in the CJS (arrest) 
experienced difficulties in gaining access to young people at arrest and obtaining 
commitment from the police. Such partnership failings hampered the ability to influence 
decisions about charging and diverting young people from the CJS.
48
 
On a different note, three schemes that worked with prisoners on discharge had common 
challenges accessing community interventions.  These were generally provided by non-
statutory agencies. While the relationships were eventually established, a considerable 
investment of time and effort was required to develop them.
49
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By contrast, in the U.S., broad-based stakeholder engagement (including bipartisan political 
support) was acknowledged as central to the successful implementation of the JRI across 
states, involving the business community, service providers, law enforcement agencies, and 
victims' advocacy groups.
50
 This emphasis also extended to garnering public support for JR 
through public education campaigns, for example, newspaper editorials in West Virginia and 
media coverage in Oklahoma of community forums hosted by the JR working group. While 
there may have been challenges in the U.S. to engaging with stakeholders, in contrast to the 
U.K., engagement appeared to have been planned for and adequately resourced. 
G.  Using Evidence 
The use of evidence based practices (EBP) was an important component of the JRI in the U.S. 
promoted by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The use of EBPs across the states involved in 
the JRI fell into four categories: "(1) monitoring for effectiveness; (2) using immediate, swift, 
and certain responses; (3) implementing risk and needs assessments; and (4) establishing 
problem solving courts to work with key populations."
51
  
In contrast, the use of evidence to support the implementation of selected schemes in the U.K. 
was far more variable. By way of illustration, of the six sites involved in the Local Justice 
Reinvestment Pilot, only Greater Manchester adopted a systematic approach to the use of 
existing evidence and generating new evidence where this was lacking.
52
 Similarly, while two 
sites in the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment Pathfinder made systematic use of data and 
evidence, this was largely absent for the other two sites which withdrew from the pilot at the 
end of the first year.
53
 This contrasts sharply with the Whole System Approach to Women 
Offenders in Greater Manchester, which was predicated on evidence supporting the adoption 
of a gender-specific approach to service delivery.
54
 
H.  Defining Outcomes 
There has been limited consideration in the U.K. about what constitutes effectiveness in JR 
and how to measure it, due to the limited number of JR initiatives implemented and lack of 
interest from the government.  Commentary on the results from the two initiatives explicitly 
labeled as JR (the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot and Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment 
Pathfinder) have naturally focused on whether or not they achieved their stated target(s).
55
 
Implicit within their reading of the results is that if the demand reduction target was achieved 
then this constitutes an effective JR initiative.   
Broadening out what success looks like, effectiveness could also be measured by outcomes 
that arise from considerations of the etiology of crime which underpin the theory of JR 
proposed by Fox and colleagues: reducing the criminality of the individual offender and 
building their capacity to resist anti-social influences; and improving the social capital of a 
neighborhood whose inhabitants might be drawn into crime.
56
 Measuring the effectiveness of 
JR beyond just the fiscal approach which has been adopted thus far in the U.K. would 
encourage wider aims and gains. 
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In the U.S., where a more systematic approach to JR implementation has occurred, the JRI 
across states has been assessed against a wider range of outcomes:  
 reduction in overall prison population or a slowing of the growth of the prison 
population 
 reduction in convictions for low level offenders 
 projected savings  
 reinvestment 
 enhanced accountability through data collection and reporting  
 system-wide collaboration 
 adoption of evidence-based practices57 
This is a more sophisticated approach to measuring effectiveness than seen in the U.K. and 
importantly gives adequate emphasis to process outcomes: enhanced accountability, system-
wide collaboration, and evidence-based practices.  
I.  Measurement 
Quite apart from the task of determining what outcomes to measure, the experience from the 
U.K. suggests that the process of measurement itself is not straightforward.   
While reducing reoffending is the most obvious outcome to use to measure “reducing 
criminality,” it is hampered by considerations such as the time taken to measure this, 
typically a minimum of 18 months
58
 and difficulties in accessing data (Police National 
Computer (PNC) for reconvictions), which are generally easily available only to the 
government as a commissioner.  The long reporting lag and lack of ready access to PNC data 
mean that providers have no opportunity to directly monitor their own progress.
59
  Perhaps 
the most obvious obstacle to using reoffending as a success measure is the requirement for a 
robust control group against which the performance of the intervention cohort is compared.  
Without this counterfactual, one cannot know whether the intervention has been successful. 
The problem is that there are significant transaction costs associated with identifying a 
statistically robust comparison cohort.
60
 If a JR intervention is implemented for the whole 
offender group across a jurisdiction (such as young offenders in England and Wales), a 
control group will not be possible. In such an instance, neither commissioners nor providers 
are able to answer the most basic evaluation question, did the intervention achieve the desired 
effect? 
While not ideal, the demand reduction approach to JR has appeal because it is easier to 
measure with data available to the commissioners and the providers—the management data 
that the providers themselves routinely collect.   
An example of this is custody bed night data, which were available to the YOTs and the 
commissioner (the Youth Justice Board) in the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment 
Pathfinder.
61
 The two sites that completed the pilot were able to estimate how many young 
people were going to be in custody and for how long. The same data were available to the 
other two sites which withdrew from the pilot at the end of the first year; however, they 
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lacked the capacity, capability, or will to use it effectively to performance manage their 
scheme.
62
 
As already acknowledged, while the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot outcome metrics 
appeared complicated because of their number, the majority of the demand metrics could be 
tracked using management information collected by the then Probation Trusts and YOTs. In 
fact, the results of the pilot were partly based on data that were collected and reported by the 
Trusts and YOTs themselves to the Government.
63
  The remaining data came from 
management information collected by Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunal Service (HMCTS).  
Only one pilot site, Greater Manchester, systematically tracked its performance.
64
 This shows 
that agencies have the potential to monitor their performance, providing either the will or 
incentive is in place for them to do so.    
The drawback of using demand reduction as a measure of effectiveness is the issue of 
deadweight, (i.e., reductions and other changes that would have happened without any 
intervention). The Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot set demand reduction thresholds which 
were intended to demonstrate that any changes were not due to natural fluctuations; however, 
the whole of England and Wales and Greater London also showed reductions above the 
thresholds, although the reductions were smaller than in the pilot sites.
65
 The evaluation of 
the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment Pathfinder was able to demonstrate using a 
statistical threshold that the reduction in custody bed nights in the two sites that completed 
the pilot was greater than would be expected from fluctuations that might naturally occur. 
This caution is highlighted in relation to the projections of prison population reductions and 
associated cost savings which underpinned the approaches adopted by the states participating 
in the JRI: 
Comparing projected population changes and cost savings with actual 
population changes and cost savings is a delicate task. Multiple factors can 
affect prison population levels, such as changes in policy and practice outside 
JRI and changes in crime rates. These factors are difficult to foresee at the 
time a projection is created. One cannot attribute all population changes, or 
lack thereof, to JRI.
66
  
Neither the U.K. nor the U.S. has overcome the challenge of being able to unequivocally 
attribute benefits to JR through the way effectiveness is currently measured. Nor has it been 
possible within the design and measurement of JR to fully account for events that could 
unexpectedly cause a spike in demand which could affect any reductions arising from JR.
67
  
II.  Discussion 
The development of JR in the U.K. has been both helped but also hindered by what could be 
referred to as the "motherhood and apple pie" syndrome. This was a throwaway but 
nevertheless telling comment by Rob Allen, interviewed for Chris Fox and colleagues: that 
JR is like "motherhood and apple pie—that no-one is going to disagree with it," precisely 
because it was possible for JR to mean different things to different people.
68
 Based on the 
experience of implementing JR in the U.K. and U.S., it is possible to define JR by its 
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operational requirements, and doing so carries the advantages of providing a common means 
of modelling JR initiatives, which enables comparisons to be made between schemes within 
and between jurisdictions, and perhaps most importantly, of setting the parameters for the 
scale/ambition of prospective schemes.   
We now turn to proposing a universal framework for JR, one that aims to enable 
effectiveness comparisons to be made between initiatives within and across jurisdictions.  
Table 1 presents the modelling component of a proposed JR commissioning and 
implementation framework. The framework incorporates the previous four dimensions which 
were influential in determining JR scale: CJS redesign, social justice, targeted offender 
population, and geographical units of delivery.  
Table 1: Modelling component  
Dimensions Variations 
Criminal justice 
system redesign 
Whole- or part-system approach based on the following stages of the criminal justice 
system: 
 pre-arrest 
 arrest 
 sentencing 
 post-sentencing: 
o community sentence 
o in custody 
o release from custody 
 
Social justice The extent to which achieving all or some of the following social capital outcomes
69
 
is an express aim of the initiative: 
 social trust and associational networks 
 lower crime rates 
 better health rates  
 improved longevity  
 better educational achievement  
 greater levels of income equality 
 improved child welfare 
 lower rates of child abuse  
 less corrupt and more effective government  
 enhanced achievement through increased trust and lower transaction costs 
 
Offender 
population 
targeted 
All offenders within a geographical area or a discrete group based on: 
 demographic characteristics: age, gender, ethnicity 
 offending history and/or risk of reoffending 
 disposal type 
 
Geographical 
units of delivery 
In the U.K.: 
 neighborhood 
 local authority area 
 sub-region (i.e., more than one local authority but smaller than a region); 
 region (in this instance defined by being an administrative region which 
equates to a police force area) 
 countrywide 
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Thus far, we have argued that the economic and data-driven nature of JR seem to demand 
that effectiveness should be measured quantitatively.  In keeping with this, the proposed 
evaluation component of the commissioning and implementation framework in Table 2 
accounts for outcomes derived from the etiology of crime and the economic basis for JR. 
These have been chosen because they fundamentally reflect the purpose of JR, map across to 
the modelling component of the framework, and draw on the experience of measurement in 
the U.K. and U.S., notwithstanding the challenges involved.  Also, critically, this component 
includes the process outcomes identified in the U.S., which if sustained would embed 
effective practice within the CJS and of themselves would enable a more effective justice 
system to prevail.   
Table 2: Evaluation component  
Outcomes Measures 
Reducing 
criminality 
 reduced crime rates 
 reduced reoffending 
 reduced demand on the criminal justice system 
 
Social justice  increased social trust and associational networks 
 lower crime rates  
 better health rates  
 improved longevity  
 better educational achievement 
 greater levels of income equality 
 improved child welfare 
 lower rates of child abuse  
 less corrupt and more effective government  
 enhanced achievement through increased trust and lower transaction costs 
 
Savings realized 
within a specified 
time frame 
 to agencies within the criminal justice system  
 to agencies outside the criminal justice system  
 to wider society not covered by the other two categories 
 
Reinvestment  pre-investment—reinvestment based on projected savings 
 post-investment—reinvestment based on actual savings 
 
Process outcomes  more effective working between agencies 
 systematic use of evidence based practices 
 greater transparency and accountability in the use and reporting of data and 
analysis 
 
 
As examined earlier, accounting for deadweight is a daunting challenge in the measurement 
of JR. A solution to this, which could parallel the development of JR, is a concerted research 
effort to build up an evidence base of cost-effective interventions and encourage their 
adoption. The model for this is the work undertaken in the U.S. by the Washington State 
Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), which arguably has developed the most sophisticated 
modelling of program costs and benefits for both justice and other interventions.
70
 In the U.K., 
a similar approach to youth justice is being undertaken by the Dartington Social Institute and 
to policing by the College of Policing.  
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Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 ground JR in the experience of JR implementation, enabling 
commissioners and providers in any jurisdiction to assess the scale of JR they wish to pursue 
and how to measure it. Indeed, using these components at an early stage of the planning 
process for JR is essential. 
Consideration of the capacity and capability of commissioners and providers to deliver JR 
has generally been limited in the discourse around JR in the U.K.  While this has been  
implicitly acknowledged in the identification of the role of data analysis and cost-benefit 
analysis in informing JR planning and evaluation, the expertise required to facilitate this has 
not been fully recognised.
71
  Perhaps understandably, greater emphasis has been placed on 
the political, policy, and structural frameworks that could and should shape JR in the U.K., 
the key features of Allen's recent papers on JR.
72
  There is a similar picture in Australia, 
where cogent arguments for the adoption of JR have been made; however, the capacity and 
capability required of organizations and individuals to effectively implement JR have not 
been examined.
73
  In the U.S., the issue of capacity and capability has been addressed through 
funding for the implementation of JRI across states and localities by the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance. The capability component based on the experience of JR implementation in the 
U.K. and the U.S. is detailed in Table 3 and completes the proposed commissioning and 
implementation framework. 
Table 3: Capability component  
Dimensions Requirements 
Project/program 
implementation 
 strategic and operational leadership 
 political support 
 communication with stakeholders 
 time for planning and set-up  
 use of evidence to support decision making 
 
Effective working 
within and between 
agencies 
 coordination 
 data-sharing agreements 
 clarity of organization roles and responsibilities 
 clarity of staff roles and responsibilities 
 ensuring co-terminosity and where not possible, addressing problems which  
arise 
 managing cultural and organizational change 
 
Monitoring and 
measurement 
 managing quality and consistency of data input and collection 
 management information systems to provide continuous feedback on 
performance 
 ready and equal access to performance data for commissioners and providers 
 data analysis capability of commissioners and providers 
 ability to make decisions based on results of analysis 
 accounting for deadweight  
 access to a robust comparator cohort 
 
 
 
As noted earlier, capability to deliver JR or any CJS intervention is often given limited 
attention.  In the U.S., the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance correctly recognized that there 
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were likely to be capability deficits across states and localities in the technical areas required 
for effective JR implementation: data and cost benefit analysis. There may be ample evidence 
about what constitutes effective project/program implementation—arguably the subject of 
every CJS process evaluation ever undertaken—but, by and large, the experience of JR 
implementation in the U.K. suggests that lessons from these evaluations have generally 
remained unlearned. 
The value of the capability component lies in being able to test out the feasibility of 
implementing the scale and complexity of any planned JR initiatives as assessed by the 
modelling and evaluation components. Used in a way that avoids optimism bias 
(commissioners and providers making over-positive assumptions about their capability), it 
should enable deficits to be uncovered which can be responded to through additional 
resourcing and/or scaling back what can be achieved to something more realistic, to avoid the 
problem of people “setting themselves up to fail.”  
III.  Conclusion—The Future of Justice Reinvestment in the U.K. 
The four-step approach to JR adopted in the U.K. and U.S., and advocated for in Australia, 
has served as a useful heuristic for how to make JR happen. Based on the experience of JR 
implementation across the three jurisdictions, the proposed commissioning and 
implementation framework complements this approach, enabling ambition to be realistically 
matched to the capability to deliver.   
The development of JR in the U.K. is likely to continue in the same asymmetric pattern that 
has prevailed to date, against a backdrop of continuing reductions in public spending.  This 
leaves a rather messy pragmatism of:  
 individual government departmental pilot initiatives with both direct (MoJ and Home 
Office) and indirect (Health, DCLG) remits for criminal justice and offenders which 
will affect demand on the criminal justice system 
 localized initiatives based on clusters of local authorities with delegated 
responsibilities and devolved budgets on the lines of Greater Manchester having a 
greater influence over the use of health and other social welfare funds and potentially 
using this freedom to influence the commissioning of justice services 
 further devolving of custody budgets for young offenders as signaled in the initial 
report of the Taylor review into the future of Youth Justice
74
 
 continued development of holistic services for women offenders which will cut across 
all stages of the criminal justice system 
 structural changes such as “academy prisons,” where full responsibility for prisons is 
devolved to individual governors, announced by David Cameron in February 2016
75
 
(and reported as the centerpiece to the Queen's speech in May 2016, which signaled 
major upcoming policy and legislative changes
76
) 
 fall-out of unintended consequences from the”'privatization” of probation services 
under the Transforming Rehabilitation changes in England and Wales
77
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As a result, advocates of JR in the U.K. may need to scale back their ambition to something 
that can be achieved and is within the grasp of the many rather than the shining success of the 
few. Modest implementation is better than no implementation at all.
 
 
In an earlier article, one of the authors of this paper and colleagues suggested that the 
development of JR in the U.K. was a journey from a criminal justice redesign starting point 
onwards to a more social justice focused destination.
78
  The evidence of JR implementation in 
the U.K. to date suggests that its future trajectory is more akin to many journeys of differing 
durations, most of which start and end at the point of criminal justice redesign, others of 
which are moving towards a social justice end, and a very small number of which start and 
end at social justice. 
Without political will, the trajectory of JR development in the U.K. is likely to be more of the 
same, i.e., piecemeal implementation through pilot programs. The Troubled Families 
Programme (extended to a further 400,000 families in England
79
) has the potential to offer a 
version of JR which harks back to the social justice model advocated by Tucker and Cadora; 
however, without a transparent accounting of measurement, its impact on JR development is 
likely to be undermined—handicapped by political conjuring.  
The development of JR in the U.K. requires careful nurturing. The proposed framework 
provides a standard approach to implementing JR which could drive delivery and 
performance, provide advocates of JR with a way of realistically operationalizing their 
aspirations, and prevent others from misappropriating JR in a way that is inconsistent with its 
underpinning principles.  Given the continued financial austerity in the U.K., this framework 
will help to strengthen the case for JR as a credible, systematic approach to delivering a more 
cost-effective and fairer criminal justice system that better serves the interests of victims, 
offenders, and society as a whole. 
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